Question Two. Whether the Three Persons can Assume Numerically the Same Nature

85. Second I ask whether the three persons can assume numerically the same nature.

86. That they can:

‘This nature’, before being assumed by some person, is assumable by any of them separately - so let them all act at the same instant for the assumption of it; therefore it is assumed either by all of them, and the conclusion is obtained, or by none of them, which is unacceptable if they are acting for the assumption of it as much as they can; or it is assumed by some single person, which is also unacceptable, for there is no more reason for it to be assumed by this person than by that, since each person is acting equally for the result.

87. Further, before the assumption of this nature by the Son, the nature was assumable by the Father; therefore it is assumable by him now.

88. Proof of the consequence:

For the nature was assumable initially because it was in obediential potency to the person of the Father, and this potency is not removed by the assumption of the nature to the person of the Son, because the personhood of the Son is not of the same idea as the personhood of the Father - or if it were of the same idea, there would not be the same obediential potency to the personhood of the Father as to that of the Son, just as neither are the persons to whom those potencies are referred the same; so the fact that one of the potencies is reduced to act does not reduce the other to act.

Besides, the nature existing in the Word has an inclination to its own supposit, because the inclination is natural to it - therefore it has an inclination to anything that is able to supply the place of its own supposit; the person of the Father is such; therefore, along with the nature’s existing in the person of the Son, there remains its potentiality for existing in the person of the Father.

89. Further, the same accident can exist in two subjects; therefore the same nature can exist in two supposits. The proof of the consequence is that the relation of accident to subject is very similar to the relation of nature to supposit, as was said in the preceding question [nn.15-16]. - The proof of the antecedent is that a glorious and non-glorious body can exist together; therefore they have the same ‘where’, and this ‘where’ is an accident of the placed or located body. But the proof that it is the same ‘where’ is that it is the same place; the one place has one active circumscribing; therefore one passive circumscribed corresponds to it, which is the ‘where’.

90. On the contrary:

Anselm Incarnation of the Word ch.9 and Why God Man? 2.9 says, “Several persons cannot assume the same man.”

91. Further, if the created supposit is multiplied, so is the nature; therefore the like applies also to an uncreated supposit. The proof of the consequence is that the uncreated supposit supplies the place of the created supposit [n.18]; therefore it distinguishes the nature in the way the created supposit would.

92. Further, what belongs to something as it is distinct from another cannot belong to that other; the incarnation belongs to the Son as he is distinguished from the Father; therefore it cannot belong to the Father. The minor is plain, because the incarnation belongs to the Son according to that property of his [sc. Son-hood] by which he is distinguished from the Father.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

93. Here the assertion is made [William of Ware] that the three persons can assume the same nature.

Because what is prior can exist without contradiction in the absence of the posterior, and consequently the prior can remain indistinct when a distinction is made in the posterior; but the idea of singularity or individuation in created nature is prior to the idea of person, as is plain, because the Word assumed an individual nature not yet existing in a person [n.32]; therefore it can remain the same individual nature although there are several personhoods extrinsic in respect of the nature.

94. Further, the distinction of relation is not a sufficient reason for distinguishing absolutes, as is plain from induction; therefore, since the distinction of divine persons is relational, there is, for this reason, no need for the absolute nature to be distinguished; but the [created] nature can be assumed by the three persons (as is plain); therefore it is possible for them to assume the nature without distinction in the nature.

95. Therefore is the assertion made that, just as the same soul can be in diverse parts of the body, and the same body can be miraculously in diverse places, so one nature can exist at the same time in two supposits (when those supposits are extrinsic and not the same as the nature).

2. Weighing of the Opinion

96. Against this there is the following objection, that the divine essence is infinite from the fact it can be the same in three persons [1 d.2 nn.385-387], therefore this human nature would be infinite if it could be in several persons.

97. Proof of the consequence:

Because the reason it could be in two persons is an equal reason for it being also in infinite persons.

Also, if it could have at the same time several perfect uncreated personhoods, then it could have at the same time a created and an uncreated personhood, or several created personhoods, because there is no greater repugnance in a created and uncreated personhood existing together in one nature than in two uncreated personhoods existing together in it, each of which perfectly supplies the place of created personhood.

98. To the first of these reasons [n.97] the response is made that the divine essence is the same for the three persons, and its being infinite follows from this identity and not from the fact merely that it is at the same time in three persons; but the assumed human nature would not be the same for the three persons but extrinsic to them, although it would be in them at the same time.

A like response is made to the second reason [n.97]: the divine nature founds the three uncreated relations and personhoods, and from this follows its infinity; but the human nature extrinsic to them would not found them.

99. Against the first response the objection is that, just as a substantial form, which gives perfection of substance to several supposits, would be a substance actually unlimited, so an ensuing accident, which actually perfected the same supposits, would be an unlimited accident (an example: just as the soul is unlimited as to perfecting several substantial parts of the body, so its knowledge is an unlimited accident with respect to the parts of the body); therefore, just as the divine essence, because it is essentially the nature of three supposits, is the infinite quasi essential nature of them, so the human nature would be infinite, although it is a quasi extrinsic nature of several supposits.

100. There is a confirmation, that it seems as impossible for one accident to exist in two first subjectsScotus Metaphysics 1 q.1 n.72, “That seems to be the first and proper subject to which the properties first belong that are per se considered in the science.” ³ as it is for one substantial form to be in two matters; therefore, if infinity follow necessarily from the fact that one substantial form is in diverse matters, then infinity would follow necessarily from the fact that one accident is in many subjects. The antecedent is plain, because an accident is adequate to the first subject just as form is to matter - and more so, because the accident converts with the subject.

101. The second reason [n.98] is flawed: the point is clear about the will, which can found diverse relations, even relations of a different idea, and yet is finite; likewise, the same white thing can found many likenesses, and the same father many paternities, without infinity; the same nature too can found many created personhoods, even an infinity of them, because an infinity of them is no more repugnant to it than two are; and thus infinity follows.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

102. One can reply to the question by making a distinction, because the first term of this union can be either the person or the subsistent essence common to the three.

1. Whether the First Term of the Union is the Three Persons

103. It cannot be the case that the first term of this union is the three persons, because it does not seem that one nature could be assumed by three persons at the same time; for, in every essential dependence, one dependent thing precisely depends on only one thing that totally terminates its dependence; in this union the dependence is essential and belongs to one nature, and one person totally terminates it; therefore the same nature cannot depend in this way on several such persons.

104. The proof of the major, in the case of every dependence of a caused thing on the cause, is that it is impossible for the same caused thing to have, in the same genus of cause, several total causes on which it depends; for the result would be that then it would still exist when the cause on which it essentially depended did not exist. For if it has a as total efficient cause and likewise b along with it as total efficient cause, then it would be sufficiently caused by a when everything else was removed - otherwise a would not be its total cause; therefore the effect would come from a when b did not exist, and so it would not depend on b. Similarly contrariwise about a, if b is posited as total cause. Therefore if a is its total cause and b likewise, each and neither will be total cause. Thus does it seem to be in the case of all dependences, even those that are not of caused things on causes, for, since the dependence of anything will be totally terminated by a given thing, it cannot depend - with a dependence of the same nature - on something else [1 d.2 n.73].This argument, which Scotus presents more than once, seems unconvincing, for ‘total’ may be understood in two ways, as sufficient cause of an effect or as the cause without which the effect would not be. So let a and b each be sufficient for a certain effect and let both be present and active at once; then, if by total cause is meant sufficient cause, each is total cause even separately because each would cause the effect even in the absence of the other; if, on the other hand, by total cause is meant the cause without which the effect would not be, then only a and b together are total cause, because only when both are removed does the effect cease to be. But that a and b are only together total cause in the second sense does not mean that they cannot separately be total cause in the first sense. Scotus’ argument works only against total cause in the second sense, while his conclusion requires it to work against total cause in the first sense. ⁴ Confirmation comes from the case of accidents in relation to several first subjects.

105. The proof of the minor is that a created personhood would totally terminate the created nature, and - while that created personhood remained - the nature could not exist at the same time in another person (created or uncreated); because any personhood of a divine person would terminate the nature, and its dependence, no less than the nature would be terminated within itself [sc. by its created personhood];     therefore etc     .

106. An objection against this is that it does not seem unacceptable for several relations of the same idea to exist in the same subject, as when the same white thing is similar to several white things; therefore likewise in the issue at hand it will not be unacceptable for the same absolute thing to depend on several persons by several dependences of the same idea. But if the dependences are posited to be of a different idea, the conclusion will be got the more.

107. I reply that, just as not every relation, whereby it is a relation, is the same as the foundation (even if some relation is such, namely one that is first in foundation to the term and the foundation cannot in any way exist without this term, as was said in 2 d.1 nn.260-263, 266-267), so neither is there repugnance to relation whereby it is relation that several relations of the same idea should exist in the same thing; but there is a repugnance in the case of certain special relations, namely essential dependences; for these are such that, if one of them is dependent on a totally terminating term, the foundation does not leave it dependent with a like dependence on anything else, because then it would not be a terminated dependence.

2. Whether the First Term of the Union is the per se Existing Essence

108. If the union is understood in another way, namely that the first term of the union is the very nature per se subsistent in the three persons, then it seems possible that one [created] nature may be assumed by the three by the quasi-medium of the one essence existent in the three, just as one whiteness could be in three bodies if the one surface, on which the whiteness was, existed in three bodies.

109. Now it does seem that the per se existing essence itself could be the proximate term of the union, because the essence does not get being from the persons but it naturally is before it is in the persons and it gives being to the persons; for the nature is of itself a ‘this’ and per se existent, though not incommunicably; and it does seem that incommunicability may not necessarily be the proper reason for terminating the union but rather singular subsistence; but then such a [created] nature would only be a person with its own personhood mediately, because it would not be united to a person first.

II. To the Principal Arguments on Both Sides

110. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.86] I say that, if all three persons were acting to the utmost of their power for the assumption of the nature, they could not act as terms of three assumptions but would act for the assumption of it by some one person who terminates it; so that, although the three are acting, nevertheless one terminates it. And when you ask, ‘by whom then would it be assumed?’, I say by the one to whom the three actively unite it.

And if you say that each person can act at the same time to unite it to himself, I deny it, both because it is incompossible for the nature to be united to two persons at the same time, and because it is impossible for the nature to depend totally with a dependence of the same idea on several persons, since it is of a nature to be terminated by one person; and the persons cannot perform incompossible things at the same time.

111. To the second [nn.87-88] I say that if there is one obediential potency in the created nature whereby it can be united to the three (that is, to any of the three disjunctively), this potency has been reduced to act by the Word’s instantiation of the nature. But if there are three potencies, I concede that one potency’s being reduced to act does not reduce another to act; and the other potency can be reduced to act, but not along with the act of another potency, because of the incompossibility of the acts (just as a potency for whiteness cannot be reduced to act along with blackness). And so the nature that is now given personhood by the Word could, if it were let go by the Word, be assumed by the Father; but as long as actual assumption by the Word remains, then, although the nature is in potency to assumption by the Father, yet the potency cannot be reduced to act because of the incompossiblity of this act with that one.

112. As to the third [n.89], I deny the assumption about accident and first subjects. In proof I say that there are two ‘wheres’ and yet both from one circumscribing place. And when it says that ‘one place has one active circumscribing’, I say that if place is something formally absolute, in which is founded, not action, but the relation that is signified by way of action (as circumscribing action), then two circumscribings for two circumscribed bodies can be founded in the same absolute thing, or there can be one absolute for the two passive circumscribings, which are called the ‘wheres’. But if place states formally a relation to the located and materially founded thing on which the relation is founded, then there is one material place - because of its unity - but two locations formally, and in each way are active and passive circumscription multiplied or co-multiplied.

113. To the first argument for the opposite [n.90] one can say that Anselm’s remark applies when the first term of the union is the person, and in this way the nature has already been assumed, for the three persons cannot so assume the same nature.

114. As to the other argument [n.91], it is conclusive when the uncreated supposit is the first and proximate term of the union, but not when it is the mediate term, because then the one assumed nature, because of the unity of that to which it is first united, can be in many supposits; nor does it belong to the assumed nature to be of itself and immediately in the three, but only through the infinite nature to which it is first united.

And if the argument is brought against this, as it was against the first opinion [n.99], that an accident existing in many persons is unlimited, just as the substance existing in the several persons is an unlimited substance - one can say that this is true when an accident gives some formal act to the things of which it is the accident; but this assumed nature, if it is first united to the essence, does not give any act to the persons or to the essence, but only depends on the essence as on one first term, to which the existence in three persons is incidental (just as now all creatures depend - by dependence of caused on cause - on the three persons as they are one in nature; and the caused is not posited as unlimited because of this dependence of the caused on the three persons, but it is posited as an unlimited caused by reason of the one first term). The argument then about the unlimitedness of the accident [n.99] is not conclusive, unless of course the accident bestows act - and this argument is not at issue in the matter to hand; hence neither does the argument have much validity against the first opinion, but it has to be solved there the way it is here, although it is contrary to the response given there [n.98].

115. To the third [n.92] the response is that instantiating the [created] nature does not belong to the Son as he is distinguished from the Father but as he is ‘this existing God’.

III. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

116. To the arguments for the opinion:

Although [n.93] individuation can be prior to personhood, yet it does not follow that individuation can be one and the same as several personhoods; for then this same conclusion could be drawn about created persons, with respect to whom individuation is naturally prior; nor can just anything prior remain indistinct along with the distinction of just anything posterior, especially when the distinction of the posterior entails in the prior something repugnant to it if it remains the same.

117. To the next [n.94] I say that although a distinction in relation does not cause a distinction in the absolute that founds the relation, yet it can cause a distinction in the absolute that naturally follows the relation and depends on it, because a distinction in a prior is sufficient for causing distinction in a posterior; but this absolute [created] nature would not precede the relations but follow them, and so, according to them [William of Ware and his followers] the persons would be distinct.

118. The examples [n.95] about the soul in diverse parts of the body and about one body in diverse places are not to the purpose, because nothing incompossible (with the informing soul or with a located body) is contained is those examples as there is here in the issue at hand.

IV. Objection to Scotus’ Opinion and its Solution

119. But there is an argument against the second part of the solution [nn.108-109]: for it is asked what unity the assumption would be made to in that part [Bonaventure].Sentences 3 d.1 a.1 q.3, “If it be said that the three persons assume one and the same man, a contradiction is involved in every way, whether the assumption is understood to be to the unity of nature or to the unity of person. For if such assumption is made to the unity of nature, then one nature is constituted from the divine and the human nature; therefore there is no distinction between the assumer and the assumed and so no true assumption. But if the assumption is to the unity of person, then the several persons communicate together in one person; therefore the several persons are not several persons... Because of this implied contradiction, then, it is neither possible nor intelligible for several persons to assume one and the same nature.” ⁵ Not to the unity of the nature, because then the nature assumed would be the same as the nature assuming; nor to the unity of the person, because ex hypothesi the person is not the term of the union but the essence is [n.109]; therefore the assumption would not be made to any unity.

120. I reply and say that the assumption would be to a unity, not of identity or of composition, but of union of this nature with that; and thus the union would be a special dependence of nature on nature, like the one that now exists of nature on person. So when you say [n.119], ‘if the assumption were to the unity of the nature, then the nature assumed would be one with the nature assuming’, I say that one should not concede the assumption is to the unity of the nature, but that there is only there a union with the nature, and only an assumption to the unity of union of nature with nature; for when ‘unity of nature’ is spoken of, then the term ‘unity’ - by the force of the [grammatical] construction - is taken for ‘unity of identity’ or ‘unity of composition’, and neither of these is present there. But ‘unity’ is not taken in this way when something is said to be assumed ‘to the unity of person’, for - by the force of the construction in this case -‘unity’ is taken for ‘unity of union’ [cf. 1 d.2 n.403].

121. On the contrary [Bonaventure]:Sentences 3 d.5 a.1 q.1, “When the action of assuming terminates at some unity, then the ‘assume’ stated of something signifies not only union but also that the union terminates at the unity of the assumer. And since the union does not terminate at the unity of nature but rather at the unity of person, therefore ‘to assume’ does not belong to the divine nature; for the divine nature did not assume the human nature into the unity of nature; and so in this way it is not conceded that the divine nature assumed it, that is, took it to itself or to its own unity. But if the term of the assuming has regard to the relation of union, then it is conceded that the divine nature assumed the human nature, that is, united it with itself; for it did unite human nature to itself, although not in the divine nature itself but in one person.” ⁶ just as this inference holds, ‘the person is the first term of the union, therefore the nature is assumed into unity of person’, so does this inference seem to hold, ‘the nature is the first term of the union, therefore the thing assumed is united in unity of nature’.

122. I reply that, although the consequences ‘therefore it is united in unity of nature’ and ‘therefore it is united in unity of person’ do not equally follow (although indeed this latter consequence does follow, because the consequent, by force of the construction of ‘unity’ with ‘person’, signifies the same as the antecedent), yet the second consequence [sc. second in n.121] does not hold, because the antecedent signifies that ‘nature’ is the term of the union but the consequent signifies unity of ‘identity’ of nature with nature or of person with person, or it signifies ‘composition’ of nature with nature. Hence the tacit assumption in one of the enthymemesPeter of Spain, Tractatus tr.5 n.3, “An enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, that is, a speech in which, when not all the propositions have been set down beforehand, a conclusion is hurriedly inferred.” ⁷ [n.121] is true, namely this one, ‘what is united to the person is united to the unity or into the unity of the person’; but the tacit assumption in the second consequence is false, namely this one, ‘what is united to the nature is united to the unity or into the unity of the nature’.

Nor is there a real difficulty here but only a grammatical one; for in reality the unity of person is not formally communicated to the assumed nature but only to it as a term of dependence, just as neither is the unity of nature - if nature were the term of the union - formally communicated to the assumed nature; nor even is some third composite thing made from the assuming person and the assumed nature, just as not from nature and nature either; but there is only a different mode of speaking when saying ‘unity of nature’ and ‘unity of person’, because in the first, from the mode of speaking, unity of identity or of composition is indicated, but in the second the locution only indicates union with the person as with the term.